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Abstract—Enabling cooperation in a NOMA system is a
promising approach to improve its performance. In this paper,
we study the cooperation in a secure NOMA system, where the
legitimate users are distributed uniformly in the network and
the eavesdroppers are distributed according to a homogeneous
Poisson point process. We consider a cooperative NOMA scheme
(two users are paired as strong and weak users) in two phases:
1) Direct transmission phase, in which the base station broadcasts
a superposition of the messages, 2) Cooperation phase, in which
the strong user acts as a relay to help in forwarding the messages
of the weak user. We study the secrecy outage performance in two
cases: (i) security of the strong user, (ii) security of both users, are
guaranteed. In the first case, we derive the exact secrecy outage
probability of the system for some regions of power allocation
coefficients and a lower bound on the secrecy outage probability
is derived for the other regions. In the second case, the strong
user is a relay or a friendly jammer (as well as a relay), where an
upper bound on the secrecy outage probability is derived at high
signal-to-noise-ratio regimes. For both cases, the cooperation in
a two-user paired NOMA system necessitate to utilize the joint
distribution of the distance between two random users. Numerical
results shows the superiority of the secure cooperative NOMA
for a range of the cooperation power compared to secure non-
cooperative NOMA systems.
Index Terms—Secure cooperative NOMA, Physical layer secu-
rity, Relay, Friendly jammer.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)systems have been popular in fifth-generation (5G) net-
works due to their high power spectral efficiency. In NOMA
systems, users are classified into orthogonal multiple access
(OMA) groups. In each group, by accommodating several
users within the same resource blocks, such as frequency and
time, the significant bandwidth and also the latency of users are
decreased. Base station (BS) superimposes the messages and
the stronger user exploits successive interference cancelation
(SIC) [1]. Ding et al. in [2], investigated the performance
of a NOMA system with random deployed users. In this
scheme, outage probability (OP) was used to demonstrate
that under a condition on power allocation coefficients and
users’ targeted data rates, NOMA can achieve a diversity order
as an orthogonal multiple access system and in the case of
ergodic sum rates, NOMA has a better performance than OMA
systems.
In NOMA systems, existence of weak users degrades the
outage performance of the system. Exploiting device-to-device
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(D2D) transmission capability of 5G users, enabling coop-
erative NOMA, enhances the efficiency of NOMA systems.
Effects of the cooperative transmission in NOMA, by applying
outage probability as a metric, was investigated by Ding et al.
[3], where demonstrated that due to the complexity limitations
of the system, utilizing all the users in a cooperative NOMA
system is not an efficient way but pairing users with more
distinctive channel coefficients provides higher gain.
In wireless networks, signals are transmitted in open to all
network users, so the security of the users must be provided.
Using the physical layer capabilities is a promising way to
maintain the security of the users. Signals are overheard by
external or internal eavesdroppers. Secrecy performance of
a cellular NOMA network in cases of single and multiple-
antenna BS was investigated in [4], where a random number
of external passive eavesdroppers are distributed according to
a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) across a circular
area. Lei et al. investigated the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of a NOMA system containing two users, multiple-
antenna BS and an external eavesdropper, who overhears only
one of the users [5]. The case of internal eavesdroppers in a
cooperative NOMA system is studied in [6].
Although cooperation in NOMA systems enhances the out-
age performance, it gives more opportunity to the eavesdrop-
pers to overhear the messages of the weaker users in the net-
work. Chen et al. studied the secrecy of a cooperative NOMA
system with a Decode-and-Forward (DF) and an Amplify-
and-Forward (AF) relay in existence of one eavesdropper. It
was shown that at high signal-to-noise -ratio (SNR) regimes,
DF and AF relays have the same performances [7]. Zheng
et al. investigated the secrecy in a network consists of two
users, a relay and some eavesdroppers [8], in which the relay
transmits the messages and generate an artificial noise in
order to decrease the SNR of the eavesdroppers to decode
the messages of the legitimate users (LUs).
Though using external relay nodes in order to realize
cooperation in secure NOMA systems has been studied in
some works [7-8], this cooperation is also possible by using
internal nodes, where the strong user acts as a relay to help
in forwarding the signal of the weak user as studied in [9]
for a simple network with a Base station, two LUs and one
eavesdropper at high SNR regimes [9].
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a
cooperative NOMA network with many LUs in existence of a
random number of external passive eavesdroppers. We assume
that every LUs are paired randomly (called strong and weak
BS
rp
S1
rl
S2
S3
re
: Legitimate User
: Eavesdropper
Fig. 1. Network model for secure cooperative NOMA transmission
users) and we analyze the secrecy performance of one pair. We
consider two cases: the security is provided (1) for the message
of the strong user, when the targeted data rate of the strong
user is greater than the weak user; (2) for the messages of both
users. In case 1, we derive a lower bound on the SOP, which
is tight in some regions of the power allocation coefficients
and users’ targeted data rates. In case 2, we derive an upper
bound on the SOP of the system at high SNR regimes. In this
case, we propose two strategies: in the first strategy the strong
user acts a relay and allocates all of its transmitting power for
sending the message of the weak user, while in the second
strategy, the strong user acts as a friendly jammer (as well
as a relay), where it allocates a proportion of its transmitting
power to send noise and the rest of its transmitting power is
allocated to send the message of the weak user.
Notation: FX (x) and fX (x) are the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of random
variable x, respectively. A is the complementary event of the event
A, where Pr
(
A
)
= 1− Pr (A), Γ (.) is the gamma function, where
Γ (s) =
∞∫
0
ts−1e−tdt and Γ (. , .) is the upper incomplete gamma
function, where Γ (p, q) =
∞∫
q
tp−1e−tdt.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider S1 as the eavesdropper-free zone with radius
rp, S1 and S2 as the user zone with radius rp to rl, S2
and S3 as the eavesdropper zone with radius rl to re, as
depicted in Fig. 1. Our system consists of a single antenna
base station which is located at the center of the S1, nl LUs
distributed uniformly in the user zone and a random number
of the eavesdroppers distributed according to a homogeneous
PPP, which is denoted by Φe with the density λe, in the
eavesdropper zone. The system model resembles the one in
[4].
Channel state information (CSI) of each LU is known
at the BS, the eavesdroppers and the other LUs but CSI
of the eavesdroppers are unknown at the BS and LUs. All
channels assumed to experience quasi-static Rayleigh fading,
where the channel coefficients are constant for each transmis-
sion block but vary independently between different blocks.
LUs are ordered according to their channel coefficients as
|hnl |2 ≤ · · · ≤ |h2|2 ≤ |h1|2, where hi = gBS,i√1+dαBS,i ,
in which gBS,i denotes the Rayleigh fading channel gain
between user i and the BS, dBS,i denotes the distance between
user i and the BS and also α is the path-loss exponent. In
this model, every two users are paired randomly with each
other and they make cooperative NOMA systems and we
investigate the secrecy performance of one pair. We remark
that each resource block is devoted to two paired users
based on the NOMA scheme. Transmitting the messages of
the users contains two phases: 1) Direct transmission phase,
2) Cooperation phase.
Consider a strong user, Um, is paired with a weak user,
Un. We study two different cases. First, the message of Um is
sent securely and second, the messages of both users are sent
securely.
A. Direct Transmission Phase
In this phase, the BS broadcasts a linear combination of
the messages of Um and Un with total power of PBS as:
X
(1)
BS = (amSm + anSn)
√
PBS ,
where am, an denote the power allocation coefficients for Um
and Un, respectively and Sm, Sn are the messages of Um
and Un, respectively. By following the NOMA protocols, we
assume that an > am and a
2
n + a
2
m = 1.
The received signals at LUs and the eavesdroppers are:
Y
(1)
j = hj (amSm + anSn)
√
PBS +N
(1)
j ,
where j ∈ {m,n, e} , N (1)j is a zero-mean additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ2j , he =
gBS,e√
1+dαBS,e
denotes the channel coefficient, in which gBS,e is the fading
channel gain between the BS and the eavesdroppers and dBS,e
is the distance between the BS and eavesdroppers. At the
end of this phase, Um performs SIC and decodes its own
message. The SNR of the Um
(
γ
m,(1)
m
)
and the maximum
SNR of an eavesdropper
(
γ
m,(1)
e
)
to decode Sm are shown
in the following:
γm,(1)m = a
2
m
PBS
σ2m
|hm|2,
γm,(1)e = a
2
m
PBS
σ2e
|he|2, e ∈ Φe.
B. Cooperation Phase
Case 1: Maintaining Secrecy at the Stronger User
If Um is not able to perform SIC, system stops working.
When Um is able to decode Sn, this phase starts and Um
transmits the message Sn with the power PC . Therefore, the
transmitted signal of Um (Xm) is shown below:
X(2)m =
√
PCSn. (1)
The Received signal at Un equals to:
Y (2)n =
√
PC
gm,n√
1 + dαm,n
Sn +N
(2)
n ,
where gm,n is the channel coefficient between Um and
Un with exponential distribution with parameter λm,n, dm,n
denotes the distance between Um and Un and N
(2)
n is a zero-
mean AWGN with variance σ2n. Un uses the maximum ratio
combining (MRC) receivers [10] to decode Sn, therefore the
signal-to-noise-plus-interference (SINR) of Un (γ
n
n) to decode
Sn equals to:
γnn = γ
n,(1)
n +min
(
γn,(2)n , γ
n,(1)
m
)
,
where γ
n,(2)
n =
PC
σ2n
|g˜m,n|2, g˜m,n = gm,n√1+dαm,n ,
γ
n,(1)
m =
|hm|
2a2n
|hm|2a2m+
σ2m
PBS
and γ
n,(1)
n =
|hn|
2a2n
|hn|2a2m+
σ2n
PBS
.
Case 2: Maintaining Secrecy at both Users
In this subsection, we study the secure transmission of the
messages of both users. We consider two strategies in which
Um acts as a relay or acts as a friendly jammer and a relay,
simultaneously (FJR). Un and the eavesdroppers are using the
MRC receivers to decode Sn.
Um is a relay: In this phase, Um acts as a relay and allocates
all of its transmitting power (PC ) to send the message of Un.
So the transmitted signal of Um is as (1) and the received
signals at the eavesdroppers and Un are as:
Y
(2)
i =
√
PC g˜m,iSn +N
(2)
i ,
where i ∈ {n, e} and N (2)i is a zero-mean AWGN with
variance σ2i , g˜m,e =
gm,e√
1+dαm,e
, such that gm,e and dm,e denote
the channel gain and distance between Um and the eavesdrop-
pers, respectively. Now we write the maximum SINR of an
eavesdropper and the SINR of Un to decode Sn as shown in
the following:
γni = γ
n,(1)
i +min
(
γ
n,(2)
i , γ
n,(1)
m
)
,
where i ∈ {n, e}, γn,(1)e = |he|
2a2n
|he|2a2m+
σ2e
PBS
, γ
n,(2)
e =
PC
σe2
|g˜m,e|2.
Um is a FJR: In this phase, Um allocates a proportion (β)
of its transmitting power for sending the message of Un and
the rest of the transmitting power is allocated for sending the
noise-like signal. So the transmitted power by Um is as:
X(2)m =
(√
βSn +
(
1−
√
β
)
XJ
)√
PC ,
where XJ denotes the noise-like signal with power 1. There-
fore, the received signals at the eavesdroppers and Un is
obtained as:
Y
(2)
i =
(√
βSn +
(
1−
√
β
)
XJ
)√
PC g˜m,i +N
(2J)
i ,
where i ∈ {n, e} and N (2J)i is a zero-mean AWGN with
variance σ2i . Now we write the maximum SINR of an eaves-
dropper and the SINR of Un as obtained:
γ
n,(2J)
i = γ
n,(1)
i +min
(
γ
n,(2J)
i , γ
n,(1)
m
)
,
where γ
n,(2J)
i =
β|g˜m,i|
2PC
σ2i+(1−β)|g˜m,i|
2PC
.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We use SOP as the metric to evaluate the secrecy perfor-
mance of the system for both cases. For simplicity, we assume
that σ2m = σ
2
n = σ
2
e = 1.
Case 1: Maintaining Secrecy at the Stronger User
In this subsection, only the security of the message of Um
is provided , where the targeted data rate of Um is greater than
the targeted data rate of Un, i.e. , Rm ≥ Rn . As described,
when Um is able to decode Sn, we have a cooperative NOMA
system, otherwise system goes to outage, i.e. , SOP=1. The
outage event
(
E
)
occurs if Um can not decode Sn
(
E1
)
or
Um can not decode Sm
(
E2
)
securely or Un can not decode
Sn
(
E3
)
. So we write the outage event as:
SOP = Pr
(
E
)
= 1− Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩E3 ) ,
whereE1 =
{
1
2 log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn
}
, E2 =
{
1
2 log
(
1+γm,(1)m
1+γ
m,(1)
e
)
≥ Rm} and E3 =
{
1
2 log (1 + γ
n
n) ≥ Rn
}
.
Theorem 1: If Rn ≤ Rm, the SOP of the system is as:
Condition 1) When a2m ≤ 122Rn+1 , then:
SOP = 1− Pr (E4)Pr (E2) .
Condition 2) When 122Rn+1 ≤ a2m ≤ 122Rn , then:
SOP ≥ 1− Pr (E4)Pr (E2) ,
where E4 =
{
1
2 log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(2)
n
)
≥ Rn
}
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1: In NOMA systems, a2m must be less than
1
22Rn
so that the strong user can perform SIC.
In the following, first we derive Pr
(
E2
)
.
Pr
(
E2
) (a)
=
∞∫
0
f
γ
m,(1)
e
(x)F
γ
m,(1)
m
(
22Rm (1 + x)− 1)dx, (2)
where (a) holds due to the independence of γ
m,(1)
e and γ
m,(1)
m .
For calculating f
γ
m,(1)
e
(x) and F
γ
m,(1)
m
(x) we follow a similar
approach as [4].
F
γ
m,(1)
e
(x) = exp
[
−µ1e
− x
PBSa
2
m Γ (η , µ2x)
xη
]
,
f
γ
m,(1)
e
(x) is written at the bottom of this page in (3), where
η = 2
α
, µ1 = ηpiλe
(
PBSa
2
m
)η
and µ2 =
rαp
PBSa2m
.
f
γ
m,(1)
e
(x) = µ1e
− x
PBSa
2
m exp
[
−µ1e
− x
PBSa
2
m Γ (η , µ2x)
xη
](
µ
η
2e
−µ2x
x
+
ηΓ (η , µ2x)
xη+1
+
Γ (η , µ2x)
PBSa2mx
η
)
. (3)
The F
γ
m,(1)
m
(x) is obtained as [4, eq(4)] :
F
γ
m,(1)
m
(x) = ϕm
nl−m∑
p=0
(
nl −m
p
)
(−1)p
m+ p
×
∑
S˜
p
m
(
m+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qN
)( N∏
k=0
b
qk
k
)
e
−
∑N
k=0 qkck
22Rm(1+x)−1
PBSa
2
m ,
(4)
where N is a parameter defined to guarantee the
complexity-accuracy trade off, ϕm =
nl!
(nl−m)!(m−1)!
and bk = −ωN2
√
1− φ2k (φk + 1) , b0 = −
∑N
k=1 bk,
ck = 1 +
[
rl
2 (φk + 1)
]α
, c0 = 0, ωN =
pi
N
, φk =
cos
(
2k−1
2N pi
)
, S˜pm =
{
(q0 + · · ·+ qN ) |
∑N
i=0 qi = m+ p
}
and
(
m+p
q0+···+qN
)
= (m+p)!
q0!···qN !
. Now by substituting (3) and (4)
into (2), Pr
(
E2
)
is derived as illustrated at the bottom of this
page in (5).
The last step for finding the SOP is deriving Pr
(
E4
)
. The
F
γ
n,(1)
n
is obtained as [4, eq(5)].
F
γ
n,(1)
n
(x) = ϕn
nl−n∑
p=0
(
nl − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
∑
S˜
p
n
(
n+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qN
)
×
(
N∏
k=0
b
qk
k
)
e
−
∑N
k=0 qkck
22Rn(1+x)−1
PBS(a2n−a2m(1+x)−1)U (−x+ θ)+
U (x− θ) ,
where θ =
a2n
a2m
, ϕn =
nl!
(nl−n)!(n−1)!
, S˜pn ={
(q0 + · · ·+ qN ) |
∑N
i=0 qi = n+ p
}
and
(
n+p
q0+···+qN
)
=
(n+p)!
q0!···qN !
.
According to [11], dm,n is a random variable with the
probability density function as:
fdm,n (r) =
2r
r2l
(
2
pi
cos−1
(
r
2rl
)
− r
pirl
√
1− r
2
4r2l
)
,
(6)
where 0 ≤ r ≤ 2rl. By using Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature
method, F
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) and f
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) are derived as the method
in [2]. The details of the proof are provided in Appendix B.
F
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) ≈ 2
pi
N∑
k=0
Bk e
−Ck
λm,ny
PC , (7)
f
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) ≈ −2λm,n
piPC
N∑
k=1
BkCk e
−Ck
λm,ny
PC ,
where Bk = −ωN
√
1− θ2k (1 + θk)
(
2 cos−1
(
(1+θk)
2
)
−
(1 + θk)
√
1− (1+θk)24
)
, B0 = −
N∑
k=1
Bk, ωN =
pi
N
,
C0 = 0, Ck = 1+(rl + rlθk)
α
and θk = cos
(
2k−1
2N pi
)
. Due to
the independence of the |hn|2 and |g˜m,n|2, Pr
(
E4
)
is derived
as the bottom of this page in (8).
Case 2: Maintaining Secrecy at both Users
In this subsection, the messages of two users are sent
securely, where the targeted data rates of Um and Un are
Rm and Rn, respectively. The only effect of cooperation
on Um is to divide the transmission duration by 2, thus in
this subsection, we investigate the SOP of Un only and for
avoiding untractable calculations, we derive an upper bound
on the SOP of Un at high SNR regimes as [7] and [9], where
PBS → ∞. We remark that at high SNR regimes, on the
condition a2m ≤ 122Rn , Um is able to carry out the SIC with
probability one. So the SOP of the system is obtained as:
SOP = 1− (1− SOPm) (1− SOPn) ,
where SOPm equals to Pr
(
E2
)
which is derived in (5). So
we write SOPn at high SNR regimes as:
SOPn = Pr


1 + θ +min
(
γ
n,(T )
n , θ
)
1 + θ +min
(
γ
n,(T )
e , θ
) < Cgn

 ,
where Cgn = 2
2Rn and T is used to differentiate between two
cases, the relay (shown by T = 2) and the FJR (shown by
T = 2J).
Pr
(
E2
)
= ϕm
nl−m∑
p=0
(
nl −m
p
)
(−1)p
m+ p
∑
S˜
p
m
(
m+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
k=0
b
qk
k
)
×
∞∫
0
µ1e
− x
PBSa
2
m exp
[
−µ1e
− x
PBSa
2
m Γ (η , µ2x)
xη
](
µ
η
2e
−µ2x
x
+
ηΓ (η , µ2x)
xη+1
+
Γ (η , µ2x)
PBSa2mx
η
)
e
−
∑K
k=0 qkck
22Rm(1+x)−1
PBSa
2
m dx. (5)
Pr
(
E4
)
= Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(2)
n
)
< Rn
}
=
∞∫
0
f
γ
n,(2)
n
(x)F
γ
n,(1)
n
(
22Rn − 1− x
)
dx =
−
2λm,n
piPC
N∑
k=1
BkCk
∞∫
0
e
−Ck
λm,nx
PC

U(22Rn − 1− x− θ) + U(−22Rn + 1 + x+ θ)ϕn nl−n∑
p=0
(
nl − n
p
) (−1)p
n+ p
×
∑
S˜
p
n
(
n+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qN
)( N∏
k=0
b
qk
k
)
e
−
∑N
k=0 qkck
(22Rn−1−x)
(a2n−a2m(22Rn−1−x))PBS

dx. (8)
1) Um is a relay : In this subsection, Um acts as a relay
and allocates all of the PC to send Sn. SOP of Un is as the
following lemma. (Proof is provided in Appendix C.)
Lemma 1: Let ζ = (Cgn − 1) (1 + θ), if θ ≤ ζ, then
SOPn = 1, otherwise we have:
SOPn = 1− F
γ
n,(2)
e
(
θ − ζ
C
g
n
)
+
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(2)
e
(y)F
γ
n,(2)
n
(ζ + Cgny) dy.
Now we calculate the F
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) and f
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) in order to
derive the SOPn, by following a similar way as [4].
Lemma 2: Let χ1 = piηλeP
η
C . The Fγn,(2)e
(x) and
f
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) are as following: (Proof is provided in Appendix
D.)
F
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) = e−χ1
e
−
x
PC Γ(η)
xη ,
f
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) = χ1Γ (η) e
−
(
χ1e
−
x
PC Γ(η)
xη
+ x
PC
)(
η
xη+1
+
1
PCxη
)
.
2) Um is a FJR : In this subsection, we investigate the
SOPn at high SNR regimes, while Um is acting as a friendly
jammer and a relay, simultaneously. So we derive the SOPn
by using the following lemma. (Proof is provided in Appendix
C.)
Lemma 3: If θ ≤ ζ, then SOPn = 1, otherwise we have:
SOPn = 1− Fγn,(2J)e
(
θ − ζ
C
g
n
)
+
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(2J)
e
(y)F
γ
n,(2J)
n
(ζ + Cgny) dy.
Now we find the terms of the SOPn as obtained in the
following.
Lemma 4: Let χ2 = piηΓ (η)λe, the Fγn,(2J)e
(x) and equal
to: (Proof is provided in Appendix E.)
F
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) = U
(
x−
β
1− β
)
+ U
(
−x+
β
1− β
)
×
exp
[
−χ2e
− x
βPC−(1−β)PC x
(
βPC − (1− β)PC x
x
)η ]
,
and f
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) is written at the bottom of this page in (9).
By following a similar approach as (7) and using Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature method, the F
γ
n,(n,2J)
n
(x) is derived as:
F
γ
n,(n,2J)
n
(x) = U
(
x−
β
1− β
)
+U
(
−x+
β
1− β
)
2
pi
N∑
k=0
Bk e
−Ck
λm,nx
PC (β−(1−β)x) .
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE SIMULATIONS
Number of iterations in Monte Carlo simulations 105
The radius of the eavesdropper zone re = 100m
The radius of the user zone rl = 10m
The radius of the eavesdropper-free zone rp = 5m
Path-loss exponent α = 4
Order of the users nl = 2, n = 1,m = 2
Users’ targeted data rates Rn = Rm = 0.1
The power allocation coefficients a2n = 0.6, a
2
m = 0.4
The density of the eavesdroppers λe = 10−3
The complexity-vs-accuracy coefficient N = 20
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical and simulation results,
where the parameters of the simulations are shown in the Table
I.
Case 1: Maintaining Secrecy at the Strong User
Fig. 2 illustrates that SOP of the system decreases by
increasing the radius of the eavesdropper-free zone (rp),
thanks to increasing the distance of the eavesdroppers. Also as
expected, by increasing λe SOP of the system increases and
the simulation results confirm our analytical results.
Fig. 3 shows the comparison of NOMA systems and coop-
erative NOMA systems with and without the eavesdroppers.
We see that at high SNR regimes, the SOP of the system
doesn’t vary by increasing PBS . Since at high SNR regimes,
the outage probability of the weak user is almost zero and
the SOP of the system equals to the SOP of the strong user
which is almost independent of PBS and only depends on
|hm|2 and |he|2. This is due to the increase occurred in ρe
by increasing PBS . So it depends on the users’ targeted data
rates and power allocation coefficients in order to determine
the usefulness of the cooperation. AS observed in Fig. 3, for
lower PBS , Coop+NOMA+Sec outperforms NOMA+Sec and
thus cooperation is beneficial, while for high PBS using the
cooperation degrades the performance of the system. This is
due to the half duplex property of the relay, in which half
of the time resource is allocated to relaying in cooperative
NOMA and thus the rate of the strong user is divided by 2.
Case 2: Maintaining Secrecy at both users
When we have secrecy at both users, the SOP of the strong
user is the same as the case of the maintaining secrecy at
the strong user and therefore we only investigate the SOP
of the weak user, while the strong user is a relay or a FJR,
at high SNR regimes (PBS →∞). As Fig. 4 indicates, for
f
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) = χ2βPCe
−
(
x
βPC−(1−β)PCx
+χ2e
−
x
βPC−(1−β)PCx
(
βPC−(1−β)PC x
x
)η )(
(βPC − (1− β)PCx)η−2
xη
+η
(βPC − (1− β)PCx)η−1
xη+1
)
U
(
−x+ β
1− β
)
.
(9)
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Fig. 2. SOP of the system versus rp for different λe values with: PC = 20dB
and PBS = 60dB.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the SOP of the cooperative NOMA systems with the
eavesdroppers (Sec+Coop+NOMA), cooperative NOMA systems without the
eavesdroppers (Coop+NOMA) and NOMA systems with the eavesdroppers
(Sec+NOMA).
PC → ∞, the SOP of Un goes to one. Since by increasing
PC , the received power at the Un and eavesdroppers increases
and therefore the eavesdroppers would be able to decode Sn
for PC → ∞ with probability one. For the lower PC , the
increment of the received power at Un is greater than the
increment of the received power at the eavesdroppers, thus
the SOP of the Un decreases by increasing PC . When β is
very close to zero, Un would not be able to decode the Sn.
Moreover, we see that for β = 0.7, the FJR strategy has a
better secrecy performance than the relaying strategy for the
high value of PC . Besides, at the low value of PC , it is better
to choose the relaying instead of FJR strategy, for the given
users’ targeted data rates and power allocation coefficients.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the secrecy performance of a cooperative
NOMA system with many legitimate users in existence of
a random number of external passive eavesdroppers in two
cases: either security of the strong user or both users were
provided, while the strong user was a relay or a friendly
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Fig. 4. SOP of the Un(weak user) for different β values.
jammer. In case 1, we derived a lower bound on the SOP which
is tight in some regions of the power allocation coefficients
and users’ targeted data rates. In case 2, we derived an upper
bound on the SOP of the system at high SNR regimes. Our
results showed that the amount of power must be allocated
to send jamming noise has an optimal value that might be
derived in a future work.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, we provide a lemma that we use it for deriving the SOP the system for the case of maintaining the secrecy at the
strong user.
Lemma 5: If Rn ≤ Rm and a2m ≤ 122Rn+1 , then we have E2 ⊆ E1.
Proof: We use proof by contradiction. Our contradiction assumption is :
1
2
log
(
1 + |hm|2a2mPBS
1 + |he|2a2mPBS
)
≥ Rm,
which implies that:
|hm|2a2mPBS ≥ 22Rm |he|2a2mPBS +
(
22Rm − 1) . (10)
Also, on the condition
a2n
a2m
≥ 22Rn − 1 :
1
2
log
(
1 +
|hm|2a2n
|hm|2a2m + 1PBS
)
< Rn,
which implies that:
|hm|2 < 2
2Rn − 1
(a2n − a2m (22Rn − 1))PBS
. (11)
By substituting (11) into (10) we have:(
22Rn − 1) a2m
(a2n − a2m (22Rn − 1))
> 22Rm |he|2a2mPBS +
(
22Rm − 1) . (12)
By using the assumptions Rn ≤ Rm and a2m ≤ 122Rn+1 , we know 22Rm − 1 >
(22Rn−1)a2m
(a2n−a
2
m(2
2Rn−1))
, which is in contrast to (12).
So we are sure that if E2 occurs then E1 will occur. Therefore, E2 ⊆ E1.
SOP of the system is as:
SOP = Pr
(
E
)
= 1− Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 ) . (13)
a2m must be less than
1
22Rn so that Um can carry out SIC and decode Sn. Now we find Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩E3) as it is shown.
Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3) = Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n +min
(
γ
n,(2)
n , γ
n,(1)
m
))
≥ Rn ∩
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩ E2
}
=
Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(2)
n
)
≥ Rn ∩
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩ E2
}
=
Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(2)
n
)
≥ Rn ∩
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩ E2
}
.
By using lemma 5 and the fact that the channel coefficients are independent (assume a2m ≤ 122Rn+1 ) we have:
Pr (E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3) = Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
n + γ
n,(2)
n
)
≥ Rn
}
Pr
{
1
2
log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩ E2
}
= Pr (E4)Pr (E2) . (14)
By substituting (14) into (13), SOP of the system is as:
SOP = 1− Pr (E4)Pr (E2) .
If the conditions 122Rn ≤ a2m ≤ 122Rn+1 , Pr
{
1
2 log
(
1 + γ
n,(1)
m
)
≥ Rn ∩ E2
}
≤ Pr (E2) hold, then the following lower bound
holds on the SOP of the system:
SOP ≥ 1− Pr (E4)Pr (E2) .
APPENDIX B
CDF AND PDF OF γ
n,(2)
n
For deriving the F
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) and f
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) , we follow a similar way as [2]. According to the exponential distribution of the
|gm,n|2, (6) and also due to the independence of the dm,n and |gm,n|2, the Fγn,(2)n (y) is computed as:
Fγc (y) = Pr
{
PC
|gm,n|
2
1 + dαm,n
≤ y
}
= Pr
{
|gm,n|
2 ≤
(
1 + dαm,n
)
y
PC
}
=
2rl∫
0
fdm,n (r)F|gm,n|2
(
(1 + rα) y
PC
)
dr
=
2rl∫
0
2r
r2l
(
2
pi
cos−1
(
r
2rl
)
−
r
pirl
√
1−
r2
4r2l
)(
1− e
−λm,n(1+r
α) y
PC
)
dr,
now by using Gaussian-Chebyshev quadrature method [2], we have:
F
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) ≈ 2
pi
N∑
k=0
Bk e
−Ck
λm,ny
PC .
Taking the derivative of F
γ
n,(2)
n
(y), we find f
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) as:
f
γ
n,(2)
n
(y) ≈ −2λm,n
piPC
N∑
k=1
BkCk e
−Ck
λm,ny
PC .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMAS 1 AND 3
We prove the lemmas 1 and 3 at the same time by using index ” T ” to differentiate between two strategies of relaying
(T = 2) and FJR (T = 2J). We follow a similar way as [9], so we have:
SOPn = Pr


1 + θ +min
(
γ
n,(T )
n , θ
)
1 + θ +min
(
γ
n,(T )
e , θ
) < Cgn

 = 1− Pr
{
min
(
γn,(T )n , θ
)
≥ ζ + Cgnmin
(
γn,(T )e , θ
)}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
, (15)
when F is written as a union of four distinct events F1, F2, F3 and F4
(
F =
4⋃
i=1
Fi
)
such that F1 ={
γ
n,(T )
n ≥ θ ∩ θ ≥ ζ + Cgn γn,(T )e
}
, F2 =
{
γ
n,(T )
n ≥ θ ∩ θ ≥ ζ + Cgnθ}, F3 =
{
γ
n,(T )
n < θ ∩ γn,(T )n ≥ ζ + Cgnθ
}
and
F4 =
{
γ
n,(T )
n < θ ∩ γn,(T )n ≥ ζ + Cgn γn,(T )e
}
. So we have:
Pr (F ) = Pr (F1) + Pr (F2) + Pr (F3) + Pr (F4) .
Since Cgn ≥ 1, then Pr (F2) = Pr (F3) = 0 and thus:
Pr (F ) = Pr (F1) + Pr (F4) . (16)
In the following, first we derive the Pr (F1). Since γ
n,(T )
n and γ
n,(T )
e are independent, so we have:
Pr {F1} = Pr
{
γn,(T )n ≥ θ
}
Pr
{
θ ≥ ζ + Cgn γn,(T )e
}
=
(
1− F
γ
n,(T )
n
(θ)
)
F
γ
n,(T )
e
(
θ − ζ
C
g
n
)
. (17)
For deriving Pr (F4), on the condition θ > ζ, we have:
Pr (F4) =
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(T )
e
(y)
θ∫
ζ+C
g
ny
f
γ
n,(T )
n
(x) dxdy =
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(T )
e
(y)
(
F
γ
2,(T )
n
(θ)− F
γ
n,(T)
n
(ζ + Cgny)
)
dy
= F
γ
n,(T)
e
(
θ − ζ
C
g
n
)
F
γ
n,(T )
n
(θ)−
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(T)
e
(y)F
γ
n,(T )
n
(ζ + Cgny) dy. (18)
Finally by substituting ( 16 - 18) into (15), under the condition θ ≤ ζ, SOPn = 1. Otherwise, we have:
SOPn = 1− F
γ
n,(T )
e
(
θ − ζ
C
g
n
)
+
θ−ζ
C
g
n∫
0
f
γ
n,(T )
e
(y)F
γ
n,(T)
n
(ζ + Cgny) dy.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We calculate F
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) by following a similar way as [4]. So we have:
F
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) = EΦe

 ∏
e∈Φe,dm,e≥0
F|gm,e|2
(
x
(
1 + dαm,e
)
PC
)
 = exp

−λe
∫
R2
(
1− F|gm,e|2
(
x
(
1 + dαm,e
)
PC
))
r dr


= exp

−2piλe
∞∫
0
re
−
x(1+rα)
PC dr

 = exp
[
−χ1 e
− x
PC Γ (η)
xη
]
,
therefore f
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) equals to:
f
γ
n,(2)
e
(x) = χ1Γ (η) exp
[
−χ1 e
− x
PC Γ (η)
xη
]
e
− x
PC
(
η
xη+1
+
1
PCxη
)
.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
We derive F
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) and f
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) by following a similar approach as [4]:
F
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) = EΦe


∏
e∈Φe,dm,e≥0
F|gm,e|2
(
x
(
1 + dαm,e
)
βPC − (1− β)PC x
)
 = exp

−λe ∫
R2
(
1− F|gm,e|2
(
x
(
1 + dαm,e
)
βPC − (1− β)PC x
))
r dr


= exp

−2piλe
∞∫
0
re
−
x(1+rα)
βPC−(1−β)PC x dr

U (−x+ β
1− β
)
+ U
(
x−
β
1− β
)
= U
(
x−
β
1− β
)
+ exp
[
−χ2e
− x
βPC−(1−β)PC x
(
βPC − (1− β)PC x
x
)η ]
U
(
−x+
β
1− β
)
,
so we have:
f
γ
n,(2J)
e
(x) = χ2βPCe
− x
βPC−(1−β)PCx exp
[
−χ2e
− x
βPC−(1−β)PCx
(
βPC − (1− β)PC x
x
)η ]
×
(
(βPC − (1− β)PCx)
η−2
xη
+ η
(βPC − (1− β)PCx)
η−1
xη+1
)
U
(
−x+
β
1− β
)
.
